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Proponents of ground, which is used to indicate relations of ontological fundamen-
tality, insist that ground is a unied phenomenon, but this thesis has recently been
criticized. I will rst review the proponents’ claims for ground’s unicity, as well
as the criticisms that ground is too heterogeneous to do the philosophical work
it is supposed to do. By drawing on Aristotle’s notion of homonymy, I explore
whether ground’s metaphysical heterogeneity can be theoretically accommodated
while at the same time preserving its proponents’ desideratum that it be a unied
phenomenon.
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1. Introduction
e introduction of the topic of ground, which is used to indicate relations of
ontological fundamentality, has contributed in part to the (re)turn to Aris-
totelian-inspired metaphysics (Fine 2001, 2012a, Rosen 2010, Schaer 2009,
2012, Raven 2012). Grounding relations between states of aairs or facts aim
to capture a non-Humean sense of priority: “[t]hey all target a particular sort
of non-causal priority which we would like to call grounding and which we
regard as a phenomenon of the highest philosophical importance” (Correia
and Schnieder 2012, 1). Grounding has been characterized as “the primitive
structuring conception of metaphysics” (Schaer 2009, 364). Proponents
of ground do not dene the phenomenon,1 but at the same time they share
Corresponding author’s address: Margaret Cameron, University of Victoria, PO Box 1700,
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1 “We should grant immediately that there is no prospect of a reductive account or denition
of the grounding idiom: We do not know how to say in more basic terms what it is for
one fact to obtain in virtue of another” (Rosen 2010, 113) Recently there have been some
attempts to analyse grounding in terms of reduction and essence: (Correia 2013), (Skiles
2014). Some proponents of grounding look to essences in order to serve as end-points in
explanatory chains, which is, according to Carnino (this volume) “quite distinct from and
does not entail the view that the explanatory claims in question should be understood in
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the inclination that ground is a unied phenomenon (Schaer 2009, Rosen
2010, Audi 2012b). Whether and how ground is unied is the subject of this
article.
While well-respected by a growing number of philosophers, ground has
also been subject to scrutiny and criticism. e charges against it range
from the serious (e.g., that ground is incoherent) to the dismissive (e.g., that
ground is superuous, useless, confused, regressive). Some recent criticisms
take issue with the claim that ground is a unied phenomenon, pointing out
ways in which it seems instead to be heterogeneous or variegated. In fact,
the heterogeneity of ground, critics complain, renders it too coarse-grained,
indeed too theoretically vacuous, to perform the metaphysically explana-
tory work its proponents claim to want from it. While there have been some
eorts to meet this charge, proponents of ground have overlooked an inter-
esting way in which ground’s purported unity and its heterogeneitymight be
accommodated—a solution, I contend, that is in principle compatible with
the Aristotelian-orientation of the proponents of ground. By drawing on
Aristotle’s notion of homonymy, I will explore whether ground is said-in-
many-ways, and thus, like other systematic homonyms in Aristotle’s phi-
losophy (e.g., priority, nature, cause, etc.), grounding’s metaphysical hetero-
geneity can be theoretically accommodated. At the same time, by identify-
ing ground as an Aristotelian homonym the proponents’ desideratum that
metaphysical ground be in some sense a unied phenomenon can be met.
In what follows I will briey (§2) outline the grounding proponents’ em-
phasis on its unied character, and summarize what are taken to be the for-
mal properties of ground (by broad consensus). Ground is putatively non-
denable, unanalyzable, and primitive. While ground is supposed to be a
unied phenomenon, in themain the proponents of ground argue only indi-
rectly for the unity-thesis, placing on opponents the burden of arguing for its
heterogeneity. Recently, Kathrin Koslicki and JessicaWilson have attempted
to do just that, and so I will (§3) outline their arguments against the unity
of ground (Koslicki forthcoming, Wilson 2014). e options between pro-
ponents and critics seem to be exhausted by characterizing ground as either
a unied phenomenon or asmerely equivocal (i.e., the same in name only).
ere is, I propose, another option: that ground is anAristotelian homonym.
Specically, ground can be seen to be what I call a core-dependent, sys-
tematic homonym. Aer (§4) outlining what Aristotle means by system-
atic homonymy, I will analyze one of Aristotle’s homonyms as an example.
Given that readers may be unfamiliar with this Aristotelian idea, I will out-
line Aristotle’s motivations for recognizing the phenomenon of homonymy,
which should at the same timemake apparent the advantages for construing
denitional terms, i.e. that one should dene grounding in terms of essence.”
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metaphysical ground as homonymous in Aristotle’s sense. In closing, I will
(§5) argue that while it is useful for neo-Aristotelians to identify ground as
an Aristotelian homonym, to do so opens up a new set of questions for the
proponents of metaphysical ground as the primitive structuring relation.
2. Ground, Its Formal Characteristics
Proponents of ground regularly urge that the notion of grounding is not dif-
cult to grasp (Cameron 2008, Schaer 2009). In the same breath they also
urge that it is unanalyzable and therefore indenable: “grounding passes ev-
ery test for being ametaphysical primitive worth positing. It is unanalyzable.
It is useful. And it is clear what we mean” (Schaer 2009).2 In addition to
its being undenable, groundingmetaphysicians insist that there is a unied
phenomenon of grounding,3 although they oer no proof of its unicity.
Recent proponents of ground nearly all proceed in their discussion and
analysis of the phenomenon by way of presenting examples of grounding
relations. Most proponents of ground take it to be a relation between either
actual entities, facts, propositions or sentences, although others (following
Schaer) take a relata-neutral approach.4 Proponents suggest that the idea of
metaphysical grounding has “a venerable pedigree” (Raven 2012, 687), citing
not just Euthyphro (that something is pious in virtue of being loved by the
gods), but also Aristotle’s science of being qua being.
What are the formal features of ground? While there is some consensus
amongst proponents, there is also ongoing controversy, which will turn out
to be important to the central question being posed here, namely, whether
ground is univocal or not. Ignoring for the moment the controversies over
each of these, the most oen cited formal characteristics are the following:
2 See (Rosen 2010, 113) for the claim that the unanalyzability, or primitiveness, of ground
does not make it exceptional: “Many of our best words—the words we deem fully accept-
able for rigorous explanation—do not admit of denition, the notion of metaphysical ne-
cessity being one pertinent example.” On ground’s analyzability, see (Correia 2013), (Skiles
2014).
3 For example, Rosen (2010, 114): “there is a single salient form of metaphysical depen-
dence to which the idioms we have been invoking all refer’. Fine (2012a) distinguishes
three species of ground: (i) metaphysical, (ii) nomological, and (iii) normative. At the
same time, however, he urges that there can be a generic notion of ground from which all
others are derived. e recent criticisms of ground’s heterogeneity specically target (i)
metaphysical grounding.
4 But Fine (2012b,a) and Schnieder (2011) (in his logical analysis of ‘because’) take ground
to be a sentential operator. Grounding proponents have not yet analyzed ‘facts’, and there
are good reasons to do so; see (Oderberg 2007). On Schaer’s relata-neutral approach, see
(Schaer 2009).
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ground is irreexive,5 asymmetrical, transitive,6 factive, andnon-monotonic.
One can also add to this list: ground is necessary (in cases of full ground), ex-
planatory, and hyperintensional.7 Given these formal properties, ground is
thereby supposed to be distinguished fromHumean-causality, truth-making,
supervenience, entailment, analyticity and conceptual priority.
As mentioned above, proponents of ground insist, without argument,
that it is a unied phenomenon, and they shi the burden of arguing for
its heterogeneity to opponents. Koslicki and Wilson recently took up this
task, and in the next section I will outline some arguments they have raised
against the unicity of ground (and thereby the univocity of ‘ground’ as an
idiom). I will then show how Aristotelian homonymy provides a way for
proponents of the unicity of metaphysical ground to defend against their
charges.
3. Critics of Ground as a Unied Phenomenon
Due to its alleged heterogeneity, despite its proponents’ claims to the con-
trary, the grounding idiom has recently been criticized as useless for pro-
viding rened metaphysical explanation. Koslicki (forthcoming) issues this
complaint: “grounding is too coarse-grained to perform the metaphysical
work for which it was intended,” and this is because ground fails to display
the unity that is required for its theoretical usefulness. Wilson argues there
is no reason to posit a relation of grounding over and above specic rela-
tions of metaphysical dependence, and thus that there is no unied, generic
metaphysical phenomenon to be found (Wilson 2014). I will outline their
primary complaints against the unity of grounding in turn.
3.1 Koslicki on Unity and Heterogeneity
Koslicki proceeds by taking issue with the purported unity of the grounding
phenomenon claimed by its proponents. If grounding is unied, in what
5 But see Jenkins (2011), who raises an important concern with the unargued-for stipula-
tion amongst proponents of ground that it is irreexive combined with the (unargued-for)
claim that such dependence relations retain the desired ontological neutrality about things
such as the identity of states (of aairs) in question. Irreexivity is also challenged by Fine
(2010) and Krämer (2013).
6 Both asymmetry and transitivity have been challenged by Rodriguez-Pereya (2005, forth-
coming), Schaer (2012), Litland (2013), Raven (2013), and Tahko (2013). I would like to
thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this point. According to Fine
(2012a), asymmetry and transitivity are criterial for partial, though not for full, ground.
7 Daly (2012) also adds two further formal properties: rst, that ground is relative and sec-
ond, that it is partial. However, it is unclear why there could not be necessarily ungrounded
facts, or that some fact necessarily has or does not have the ground that it has and no others.
I would like to thank Mike Raven for drawing my attention to these considerations.
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does its unity consist? Koslicki identies three possibilities:
(i) e “single-relation” interpretation: “there is only a single ground-
ing-relation and it is exemplied by all cases which allegedly present
us with grounding connections”;
(ii) e “single-genus” interpretation: “allows for distinct specic
grounding relations, but posits that these distinct specic ground-
ing relations fall under a single generic kind, viz. grounding”;
(iii) e “mere resemblance” interpretation: “requires only that the dis-
tinct relations which go under the name, ‘grounding’, exhibit vari-
ous objective similarities” (Koslicki forthcoming).
Regarding (i): As a single relation, ground would be a unied phenomenon
and thus, pace to proponents of ground who declare it to be unanalyzable
and undenable, it would be amenable to denition. Consider, for exam-
ple, a recent characterization byAudi of ground as “essential connectedness”
(Audi 2012b):
when a given instance of maroonness grounds a coincident instance
of redness, this fact manifests the natures of the relevant properties. It
is part of their essence to behave in this way when instantiated. (Audi
2012b, 695, my emphasis)
Manifesting the natures of the relevant properties, then, would exhibit the
unity of the grounding relation amongst its instances. However, as Koslicki
correctly points out, compare the case of the grounding of redness in the co-
incident instance of maroonness, which is a case of a determinate/determin-
able relation (countenanced by all grounding theorists) with the case of the
grounding of a moral property in a natural one (also so countenanced), for
example, when an instance of telling-a-lie grounds an instance of moral
wrongness in an act.8 In the former case, it is always and necessarily true
that instantiations of maroonness always give rise to simultaneous instanti-
ations of red by the same object. However, in the latter case, in which the
moral is grounded in the natural, it is not true that every case of telling-a-lie
grounds an act of moral wrongness, as Koslicki rightly notes, since (say) for
a well-informed Kantian the act of telling-a-lie may not be morally wrong
if it is done to save a life. However, the appeal to ground was supposed to
8 Interestingly, just as the proponents of ground introduce their subject by illustrating it with
examples, so too the critics adjudicate it by evaluating and contrasting the given examples.
Even a proponent of ground agrees with the strategy of the critic: “I think the critics’ best
hope is to attack the examples (as Chris Daly does)” (Audi 2012a, 107, referring to Daly
2012).
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explain the single relation of essential connectedness, or necessity, that is at
work in each of these cases. Yet these two cases do not manifest the same
type of relation. e distinction between the two cases can be explained
in terms of, perhaps, dierent types of necessity at work (e.g., in the for-
mer, metaphysical necessity, whereas in the latter, hypothetical necessity).
Accordingly, Koslicki contends that ground does not seem to be a single re-
lation, such as one of essential connectedness, at least not for the examples
cited by its proponents, and does not seem to be denable.9
Regarding (ii): Similarly for the interpretation of the unity of ground as
a genus. Koslicki proceeds by comparing dierent examples of grounding
relations to show that it is dicult to see what general characteristics or fea-
tures they share. To take just one example, compare the grounding relation
that obtains between a determinable fact (e.g., the ball’s being red) and a
determinate fact (e.g., the ball’s being maroon) and that which obtains be-
tween a genus (e.g., the fact that this gure is an equilateral rectangle) and its
species (e.g., the fact that this gure is a square). If the grounding relation is
supposed to be a single genus over these two species, then it is dicult to see
what it is that makes these, in fact, species of one and the same genus. For
in the case of the determinable/determinate facts, the more specic colour
maroon is what grounds the more general colour red. But in the case of the
species/genus relationship, what grounds the more specic, the fact that the
shape is a square, is the more general, the fact that it is an equilateral rect-
angle. us, the directions of explanation go in opposite ways, one from
specic to general, the other from general to specic. And so, at least on
the face of these commonly used examples given by proponents of ground
to illustrate the general grounding relation, it is dicult to see that they are
suciently similar to consider them to be two species of a general relation.
If Koslicki is correct, then by process of elimination grounding phenom-
ena are similar to one another only by (iii) “mere resemblance”. Koslicki
claims that, given the objective dierences between varieties of ground, the
grounding idiom is not able to do the ne metaphysical work required. For
Koslicki, then, the grounding relation is ambiguous or homonymous, by
which she means (I think) that instances of what are called ‘ground’ are the
same in name only. Note that Koslicki has carefully indicated the ways in
which dierent relations that are called ‘grounding relations’ exhibit impor-
tant objective dierences. At the same time, however, she recognizes that
9 Much more needs to be said about the necessity at work in grounding relations. Whether
grounding necessitarianism can even be defended has recently been considered by Skiles
(forthcoming). Whether or not it can, Koslicki has correctly pointed out that there are
obviously dierent types of necessity in these twoputative cases of grounding, and certainly
this needs to be explained (or explained away).
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there are objective similarities among them (albeit underdetermined and
coarse-grained ones), such as the three formal properties that seem (albeit
not uncontroversially) to be present in cases of grounding relations (e.g.,
irreexivity, asymmetry, transitivity). How can these objective similarities
be explained? Moreover, are these objective similarities sucient to retain
ground as a non-univocal but notmerely equivocal idiom? Answers to these
questions will be advanced in §4, but rst let us review Wilson’s criticisms.
3.2 Wilson Against the Generic Unity of Ground
Wilson raises a number of complaints about the ecacy of the grounding id-
iom for metaphysical explanation. Distinguishing between what she labels
“‘big-G’ Grounding” and “‘small-g’ grounding” relations, Wilson dismisses
the former for being underdetermined, if not vacuous, and urges instead
that we need always to appeal to the latter in order to acquire “even basic
explanatory illumination” (Wilson 2014, 19). Generalizing from characteri-
zations given by its main proponents,10 Wilson depicts Ground as the genus
of various specic grounding relations, such as type identity, causal compo-
sition relations, determinable-determinate relations, and so on.11 Wilson’s
characterization of the generic Grounding relation emphasizes its alleged
responsibility for identifying a “distinctive kind of metaphysical relation,”
(Wilson 2014, 4, quoting Fine 2012a, 38) namely constitutive determination,
and for its putative primitiveness, (for some proponents) its ontological neu-
trality, and its unity. I will focus on her criticisms of the latter, that is, on the
claim that Ground is unied.
Wilson does not ever consider whether ground is a single relation (i.e.,
Koslicki’s option (i)). Rather, her exclusive focus is on the phenomenon as a
genus with various species of relation. Picking up on clues suggested by pro-
ponents, it might seem understandable why Wilson distinguishes between
Ground (the generic relation) and grounding (the specic relations). Given
the insistence that G(g)round is claimed to be a unied phenomenon, and
that theG(g)rounding idiom is thereby supposed to be univocal, therewould
seem to be a need to posit a generic sense in order to capture whatever sort
of dependence each of the various species of grounding relation shares. Wil-
son refers explicitly to Sider’s insistence that none of the special grounding
relations on its own can capture what is distinctive about Ground:
Sider takes the use of expressions such as ‘in a grounding relation’
10 Wilson (2014) focuses mainly on Fine (2001, 2012a), Audi (2012a) and Schaer (2009).
11 Koslicki (forthcoming) briey suggests that Wilson has included types of metaphysical
relations that may not turn out to be dependence relations aer all.is does not aect the
substance of this discussion of G(g)round’s unity, although it may overstate the problem
for proponents.
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to provide terminological support for there being a general notion of
Grounding, not reducible to any specic grounding relation. (Wilson
2014, 22)
Accordingly, Wilson proceeds to analyze Ground as genus and grounding
relations as species.
According to Wilson, however, on its own the appeal to ‘big-G’ Ground
as an explanation accomplishes no metaphysical work. Rather, “investiga-
tions into metaphysical dependence, conducted without any reference to
specic details, cannot be carried out” (Wilson 2014, 15). Wilson’s obser-
vation is certainly borne out by much of the grounding literature, in which
proponents cite examples of grounded relations and then explicate the na-
ture of those relations by appeal to specic metaphysical relations, such as
the determinable-determinate relation, or the genus-species relation. Given
this, Wilson asks,
insofar as appeal to specic ‘small-g’ grounding relations is required
to gain even basic illumination aboutmetaphysical dependence, what
if any point is there moreover to positing Grounding? (Wilson 2014,
19)
On the face of things, the observation that explanations of relations of
metaphysical dependence require reference to the species of relation at work
seems such an obvious one that one wonders if something has gone wrong,
either in Wilson’s characterization of G(g)round or in grounding theory it-
self. By pressing a distinction between ‘big-G’ Ground and ‘little-g’ ground-
ing relations, and then by claiming that metaphysicians need always to ap-
peal to the latter in order to be informative, Wilson has in eect eviscer-
ated ‘big-G’ Ground, leaving it without the capacity to do any ner-grained
metaphysical work.12 If Wilson is correct about the relative uninformedness
of ‘big-G’ Grounding claims, then the special determination relations that
have gone under the generic Grounding heading turn out to be variegated
and disunied. Ground appears not to be unied and, according to Wilson,
the grounding idiom is rendered uninformative and thus useless.
Whether or not Wilson’s arguments are successful, by pressing the pro-
ponents’ characterization ofGround as a generic relationwith several species,
Wilson has presented a formidable challenge to proponents on the unity
question. IsGround somethingmetaphysically robust and explanatory, over-
and-above its species, or is it merely a generic concept or term that rather
12 According to Wilson (2014, 10), “is underdetermination [of ‘big-G’ Ground] will high-
light just how uninformative Grounding claims are, by way of contrast with the detailed
illumination to be gained by appeal to the specic.”
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unhelpfully merely gestures towards types of metaphysical dependence rela-
tions? For reasons dierent than those identied by Koslicki, Wilson’s criti-
cisms of the unity claim in eect amount to the same. at is, she presents
this challenge to proponents of Ground: either they explain how the phe-
nomenon is a unity, or they admit that it is too heterogeneous to do eective,
metaphysically explanatory work.
Koslicki and Wilson see two main options: ground is either unied or
not. Both argue for its heterogeneity. ere is another alternative not con-
sidered: it is time to see whether ground is an Aristotelian homonym.
4. What is Aristotelian Homonymy?
Homonymy is the rst technical notion dened in the Aristotelian corpus,
appearing for the rst time in the rst book of the Categories. is text fa-
mously (and frustratingly) opens abruptly with three denitions: homo-
nymy, synonymy and paronymy. It is clear that these are denitions not
of words or word-uses, but of things themselves. is is the denition of
homonymy, which is also the very opening lines of Categories:
When things have only a name in common and the denition of being
which corresponds to the name is dierent, they are called homony-
mous (homonyma legetai). us, for example, both a man and a pic-
ture [of a man] are animals.ese have only a name in common and
the denition of being which corresponds to the name is dierent; for
if one is to say what an animal is for each of them, one will give two
distinct denitions. (Cat. 1, 1a1–5)13
On the basis of this explanation, it is not immediately clear how homonymy
should be construed.14 At rst glance, we might be inclined to think that
these two things—a man and a picture of a man—which can be called by
the same name, do indeed have something in common, namely being a man
and a representation of a man. Aer all the man and the picture of the man
both answer the question, ‘What is this?’ with the same answer, ‘An animal
[i.e., the species or kind of thing thatmen are]’. Aristotle points out, however,
that theman and the picture of aman turn out to be dened in distinct ways.
is is because what it is to be aman andwhat it is to be a picture are distinct
types of things.
13 Paronymy, unlike homonymy and synonymy, seems to be at base a grammatical relation in
which words “get their name from something with a dierence of ending . . . for example,
the grammarian gets his name from grammar” (Cat. 1a13–15).
14 e history of interpretation of the Categories, and of ways of construing what Aristotle
means here by homonymy, is extensive. On the ancient commentators’ interpretations,
see (Anton 1969) and (Barnes 1971). For contemporary interpretations, see (Owen 1960),
(Owens 1963), (Leszl 1970), (Ackrill 1979), (Irwin 1981), (Cleary 1988), (Shields 1999),
(Ward 2008).
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Given that the account (or denition) of a man and an account of a pic-
ture <of a man> are distinct, is referring to both of these items as ‘animals’ a
case of what we might call ‘discrete’15 homonymy?
(1) Discrete homonymy:
x and y are homonymously F i (i) they have their name in com-
mon, but (ii) their denitions have nothing in common and so do
not overlap in any way. (Shields 1999, 11)
Discrete homonymy is of no philosophical interest whatsoever. It corre-
sponds to the denition of ‘homonymy’ followed by contemporary linguists,
who regard homonymy as a strictly linguistic phenomenon:
[It is the] relation betweenwordswhose forms are the same but whose
meanings are dierent and cannot be connected: e.g. between pen
‘writing instrument’ and pen ‘enclosure’. (Matthews 2007)
While there are some examples of homonyms given by Aristotle through-
out his writings that seem somewhat similar to this type of ‘sounds-like’
word-relation,16 whichAristotle characterizes as a homonymby chance (apo
tuches), it is extremely unlikely that this is what Aristotle had inmind for his
broader theory of homonymy. Aer all, in the characterization of homonymy
given in the Categories, Aristotle claims that the accounts of a man and a
picture of a man are distinct, but they are not without some overlap. For
example, the denition of man will factor to some extent in the account of
what it is to be a picture of a man. Since an account of each one would make
reference to animal, there is some resemblance between a man and a picture
of a man.
It becomes evenmore unlikely that Airstotle is interested inmere homo-
nyms by chance when the full extent and importance of Aristotle’s use of
homonymy throughout his corpus is examined, where we will nd evidence
that he recognized the phenomenon which will be called systematic homo-
nymy.17
15 Following (Shields 1999).
16 See the discussion in (Shields 1999, chapter 1), especially of Aristotle’s De Generatione et
Corruptione 322b29–32, inwhich in discussing the homonymy of ‘contact’, “Aristotle clearly
and indisputable refers to words (onomata)” (Shields 1999, 13). See also Topics 107a18–23.
17 Aristotelian homonymy, as will be described here, is more akin to what contemporary lin-
guists call ‘polysemy’: “e case of a single word having two or more related senses. us
the noun ‘screen’ is polysemous [p6lI"si:m9s], since it is used variously of a re screen, a
cinema screen, a television screen, and so on” (Matthews 2007). However, both are im-
precise and fail to capture Aristotelian homonymy, since the latter is not (or not merely) a
relationship between words or word-uses.
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(2) Systematic homonymy:
x and y are homonymously F i (i) they have their name in com-
mon, and (ii) their denitions overlap, but not completely.18
Condition (i), having a name in common, is self-explanatory. But what does
it mean to say that (ii) their denitions overlap, but not completely? What is
partial, non-comprehensive overlap in denition?
It is helpful to contrast systematic homonymy with what Aristotle calls
synonymy. According to his explanation, things are synonymous,
when things have the name in common and the denition of being
which corresponds to the name is the same. (Cat. 1, 1a6.)
For example, take a case in which there is a human and an ox. Both hu-
mans and oxen share a name, ‘animal,’ and since they are both species of one
and the same genus, they can be dened in the same way. ings are syn-
onymous, then, if they are able to be dened in (or said in) the same way.
According to Aristotle, denition is possible for things, or for the terms for
things, which ‘signify one thing’ (Metaphyiscs IV 4, 1006a32).19 What is
signied by a denition is the essence of the thing to which the term ap-
plies (APo II.3, 91a1; 10, 93b29; Top. I.5, 101b38). Only one denition should
be given to each denite nature or essence (Top. VI.4, 141a31). But not all
items in reality are amenable to denition in this way. Homonymous things
are not, since while they may share the same name, their denitions do not
completely overlap.
Distinguishing between synonymous and homonymous items is a cru-
cial strategy in Aristotle’s philosophy.e suggestion that things, rather than
words, are synonymous and homonymous will undoubtedly strike readers
as a foreign idea, but there is a parallel that might help to illuminate Aristo-
tle’s point.e parallel is with the phenomenon of denition. For Aristotle,
18 Modied, from (Shields 1999, 11); Shields calls this “comprehensive homonymy”, although
he characterizes it somewhat dierently than I do here.
19 While this may seem to suggest that it is terms, rather than things, which are dened, we
must remain as tolerant as we can of Aristotle’s frequent shis between speaking about
things on the linguistic level and things in the real world. It is not the case that Aristotle
was confused, slipping thoughtlessly between words and the things picked out by those
words. No—Aristotle was a linguistic realist, as he himself outlines in the rst part of
On Interpretation, such that the ultimate referents or meanings of linguistic expressions
are things in extramental reality. See On Interpretation 1, 16a3–9. As a linguistic realist,
Aristotle’s doctrine about the relation between linguistic expressions and the thoughts and
extramental things signied by them is best construed as conformalist, i.e., words express
the formal features of reality itself. It helps to recognize that, for Aristotle, names for things
and their denitions are in fact themselves synonymous, since (for example) the name
‘human’ and the denition ‘rational, mortal animal’ signify one and the same thing, i.e.,
the essence of being human. SeeMet. IV.4, 1006a31.
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there can be both nominal and real denitions, in which the former are akin
to word meanings or modern-day dictionary denitions, and the latter are
explanations of the essences or natures of things themselves.20 When we are
able to articulate a real denition—and this is the very goal of intellectual
enquiry (episte¯me¯) for Aristotle—we are in eect carving out from reality,
i.e., articulating, what it is to be something. In parallel fashion, a discrete
homonymmerely tracks how things are called in accordance with similarity
of sound (or script), whereas a systematic homonym tracks how things are
in accordance with similarity of essence or nature.e focus is on similarity,
not sameness, of essence, since if essences were one and the same we would
have a case of synonymy. Putting to the side Humean-type epistemic wor-
ries about whether we can reliably track similarity of essence, we can at least
begin to see the Aristotelian idea.
We encounter homonymy again in another of Aristotle’s logical works,
the Topics, a treatise which, according to Aristotle,
proposes to nd a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason
from reputable opinions about any subject presented to us, and also
shall ourselves, when putting forward an argument, avoid saying any-
thing contrary to it. (Top. I.1, 100a20)
Aristotle points out the instruments which are to be used in order to con-
struct arguments: “one, the securing of propositions; second, the power to
distinguish in how many ways an expression is used; third, the discovery of
the dierences of things; fourth, the investigation of likenesses” (Top. I.13,
105a22–25.).e second instrument is crucial, since
it is useful to have examined the number of uses of a term both for
clearness’ sake (for a man is more likely to know what it is he asserts,
if it has beenmade clear to him howmany uses it may have), and also
with a view to ensuring that our deductions shall be in accordance
with the actual facts and not addressed merely to the word used. For as
long as it is not clear in how many ways a term is used, it is possible
that the answerer and the questioner [in a dialectical argument] are
not directing their minds upon the same thing. (Top. I.8, 108a 18–24)
is instrument is key for determining “whether a term is used inmanyways
or in one only” (Top. I.15, 106a9–10).
e Topics, accordingly, introduces some tests that can be used in or-
der to distinguish between synonymies and types of homonymies. For any-
one engaged in argumentation, it is crucial to be able to distinguish between
20 For an account of how scientic progress is made by inquirers moving from nominal to
real denitions by means of empirical investigation and the logic of demonstration, see
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, recently outlined in (Charles 2000).
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cases of (1) discrete homonymy (where there is no denitional overlap) and
(2) systematic homonymy (where there is denitional overlap).
To illustrate Aristotle’s method for testing for homonymy, here are some
examples. Imagine that we are to discern whether the property of being
sharp, when applied both to musical sounds (e.g., ‘at note is sharp’) and
to people (e.g., ‘She’s a sharp person’), is synonymous or homonymous. One
way to do so is to determine whether there is any correspondence between
the contraries of being sharp in each case.
Test for contrariety (Top. I.15, 106a9–21)21
musical sound intelligent persons
sharp at sharp dull
not the same
e test for contrariety suggests that there is evidently no resemblance
between a sharp sound and a sharp person, no common quality or essence,
as evidenced by the fact that their contraries are utterly distinct. Since there
is no means by which we can compare atness and dullness, which are the
contraries in question in these two cases, we have acquired some insight into
the reference to the property of being sharp in these two cases. erefore,
‘sharp’ in this comparative case is a discrete homonym, and has no philo-
sophical signicance.22
But is ‘sharp’ ever a systematic homonym? Let us use the quality of
sharpness used in the comparative context not ofmusical sounds and people
but of knives (e.g., ‘is knife is sharp’) and skilled people (e.g., ‘is pro-
fessor is sharp’). In this case, Aristotle proposes that the things called sharp
are themselves compared with one another.
Test of comparability (Top. I.15, 107b13–18)
A knife is sharp
A professor is sharp
But a professor cannot be sharper than a knife
(or vice versa)
21 See also DA II.8, 420a29. I have borrowed the labels for these tests from (Shields 1999,
50–54).
22 Note that this is not true for Aristotle’s medieval readers, who construed this as a case of a
translation of meaning from a term’s original sense. It is similar to a metaphorical use of
the term.
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e quality of sharpness is not univocal, i.e., not synonymous, since the
things named by synonymous terms should admit of comparison. is is
because to be synonymous is to be denable, and being denable is to be
able to identify the type of thing something is. All things of that type (of
that species or genus) accordingly should be comparable with one another.
(Contrast this case with, say, the sharpness of a stick and that of a knife,
which are clearly comparable along the same dimension.) Since there is no
way to compare knives and professors along the domain of their sharpness,
to be sharp is therefore homonymous. However, is it a discrete homonym, as
in the preceding example, or a systematic one? is is not entirely clear, al-
though Aristotle might concede that this is nearer to a systematic homonym
than a merely linguistic one. Both the sharpness of the blade and the sharp-
ness of the professor’s mind are specic conditions of being, that is, they are
the end-points or limits of those things in a particular condition.23 Accord-
ingly, there is some overlap, i.e., some similarity, between these two cases of
being sharp, in the sense that both the knife and the professor are character-
ized in terms of their end-point or best way of being what they are.
Let us consider another test for homonymy. With this test and this ex-
ample, we can begin to see other ways in which denitions of a given thing
can overlap, but not completely.
Test based on dierence in contradictory opposites (Top. I.15, 106b14–20)
failing to perceive
sensing grasping the point
Sensing and grasping the point are contradictories. How does this in-
dicate the homonymy of failing to perceive (and its contrary, perceiving,
aithanesthai)? Both perceiving and failing to perceive have as their con-
tradictories a bodily mode of perceiving/failing to perceive (sensing/non-
sensing) and an intellectual mode of perceiving/failing to perceive. Given
that there are two modes of having or failing to have perception, Aristotle
has identied a non-accidental way in which we speak about failing to per-
ceive. Perceiving and failing to perceive are thus homonyms whose modes
are related to one another.eir denitions will overlap insofar as they both
refer to having perception, but not completely since one is bodily and the
other intellectual.
23 In a similar way in Physics V Aristotle notes that there is something comparable between
the end of a line and the end of a walk, even though lines and walks are not, strictly speak-
ing, comparable along the same dimension.
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Other tests include: whether contraries exist (Top. I.15, 106a24–35),
whether there are intermediates (Top. I.15, 106a35–b12), examination of in-
ections and paronyms (Top. I.15, 106b29–107a1), comparison of signica-
tions (Top. I.15, 107a3–18), sameness of genus (Top. I.15, 107a18–30), test by
denition and abstraction (based on subtracting equals from equals, where
equals should remain) (Top. I.15, 107a36–b5), distinctness of dierentia (Top.
I.15, 107b26–31), and test for confusion between dierentia and species (Top.
I.15, 107b32–6). In all of these tests, the goal is to determine whether items
having the same name either have or do not have overlapping denitions.
e tests enable the philosopher to ascertain whether there is some shared
feature—either a common genus, or a common dierentia, which are the
two components of a denition—or not.24
While these various tests for homonymy may be useful for detecting
cases in which items with the same name turn out to be related to one an-
other by way of overlapping but non-identical denition, we do not at this
stage have a means by which to organize the various overlapping denitions
to see how they are connected to one another. In the case of homonyms
such as, say, ‘sharpness’, ‘seeing’, ‘nature’ or ‘being’, is one of the denitions
more privileged than another? Are there core and dependent instances of
homonymous items? What sense can we make of having detected instances
of homonymy? Answering these questions requires us to turn to the idea
introduced by Aristotle in the Metaphysics according to which systematic
homonymy is now recognized to be organized around a core. We will call
this (2*) core-dependent, systematic homonymy.
(2*) Core-dependent Systematic Homonymy:
x and y are homonymously F i (i) they have their name in com-
mon, (ii) their denitions overlap, but not completely, and (iii) they
are organized around a core sense or instance of F.25
Core-dependent systematic homonymy (2*) seems to be a modication of,
or advance upon, Aristotle’s recognition of systematic homonymy (2).26 e
24e dierentia is that feature of a species which distinguishes it from other members of its
genus. For example, oxen and humans are bothmembers of the genus animal, but humans
are distinguished from other members of that genus by their distinctive feature of being
rational. Rationality is the dierentia of the species human.
25 Core-dependent systematic homonymy was elaborated during the middle ages into the
Doctrine of Analogy, which provided various means by which to organize homonyms
around a core. See (Ashworth 2013) for an overview.
26ere is some question as to whether Aristotlemeans the same by ‘homonymy’ throughout
his corpus, or whether the notion evolved and changed from its introduction in Categories
to its application in Metaphysics. is issue is taken up by Ward (2008), and I broadly
agree with her assessment that homonymy is used to distinct purposes in various aspects
of Aristotle’s philosophy.
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addition is (iii), that x and y are organized around a core sense or instance of
F. To be a core sense of F, e.g., to be the core sense of what it is to be sharp or
what it is to be healthy, is to be that sense around which all other instances
of being sharp or being healthy are organized. ‘Core’ is not Aristotle’s own
characterization. Rather, he described what we are calling core-dependent
systematic homonymy in this way:
ere are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but they
are related to one central point, one denite kind of thing, and are not
[merely discretely] homonymous. (Met. III.2, 1003a33–35)
at is, things are not homonymous simpliciter, but are homonymously re-
lated to one thing.
In theMetaphysics, Aristotle puts core-dependent systematic homonymy
to positive philosophical use. As it turns out, many things are homonymous,
or are, as Aristotle puts it, said-in-many-ways. To name a few: sameness, dif-
ference, unity, priority, posteriority, source/principle, the body, friendship,
the healthy, the medical, the state, justice, whole, part, genus, species, and
others. ese are, clearly, important philosophical topics. Aristotle adds to
these topics some of the more central metaphysical ones in his philosophy:
being, oneness, actuality, potentiality. It would be a challenge to explain the
various ways in which Aristotle construes these as systematic, rather than
discrete homonyms, let alone to determine whether or not he is successful
in doing so. Aristotle does not present a theory of systematic homonymy,
although it is obvious that the philosophical device is used by him for a wide
range of topics to discern unity in multiplicity without univocity (or syn-
onymy).
While in the Topics Aristotle does not emphasize that homonyms are
structurally organized around a core, inMetaphysics Book IV the relation of
ontological dependence between homonyms is clear (what is called pros hen
homonymy). So, what is systematic, core-dependent homonymy?27 Take as
an example Aristotle’s treatment of the homonym nature, which according
to Aristotle is said-in-many-ways.
27 Owen (1960) dubbed this ‘focal meaning’, which is an unfortunate and misleading charac-
terization, not least because ‘meaning’ suggests that this is a purely semantic phenomenon
when Aristotle seems to want it to have metaphysical implications. Or, one can retain
this characterization while bearing in mind that for Aristotle, ‘to signify’ is to raise an un-
derstanding of a thing in someone’s mind, which can be non-semantically interpreted in
terms of signication being essence-specication. What should be emphasized most of all
is that Aristotelian homonymy is not to be compared, as it sometimes has been, in any way
to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘family resemblance’. As Hintikka (1971) made perfectly clear,
“Aristotle unmistakably like his concepts neat. In contrast, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy
embodies a radical distrust of almost all clear-cut conceptual distinctions.”
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Aristotle recognizes that people speak about nature and what is natural
in many ways.28 Nature (physis) is called:
(i) e genesis (origin) of growing things;
(ii) e primary immanent element in a thing, from which its growth
proceeds;
(iii) e source from which the primary movement in each natural ob-
ject is present in it in virtue of its own essence;
(iv) e primary matter of which any non-natural object consists or out
of which it is made, which cannot be changed or modied from its
own potency (e.g. bronze is said to be the nature of a statue and of
bronze utensils);
(v) e substance (ousia) of natural objects
(vi) When things have their form (eidos) and shape (morphe). (Met.
IV.4, 1014b16–1015a12)
ere is no Platonic form of nature to which all of these ways of speaking
of nature refer. ‘Nature’ is not a univocal term, and thus nature itself is not
a synonym that admits of a single denition. On the contrary, these vari-
ous, overlapping but non-identical ways of speaking of nature indicate that
nature is an Aristotelian homonym.
We can see from this catalogue that nature is spoken of (i) as origin, (ii)
as preexistent thing, (iii) as source ofmotion, (iv) asmatter, (v) as substance,
and (vi) as form. But what, if anything, gives order to these various ways
of speaking about nature? In other words, is there anything that prevents
nature from being heterogeneous, and thus talk of nature from being hope-
lessly ambiguous? To answer this question, Aristotle shows how the ways in
which nature is said are ordered by reference to a core sense:
From what has been said, then, it is plain that nature in the primary
and strict sense is the substance of things [(v)] which have in them-
selves, as such, a source of movement; for the matter is called nature
because it is qualied to receive this, and processes of becoming and
growing are called nature because they are movements proceeding
from this. And nature in this sense is the source of the movement of
natural objects, being present in them somehow, either potentially or
actually. (Met. IV.4, 1015a13–19)
28 Aristotle frequently uses the investigativemethod of examining people’s commonopinions
(endoxa) about some thing in order to begin his own analysis of that thing. For a more
familiar illustration of the use of this method see Nicomachean Ethics, book I, in which
Aristotle canvasses the many ways people speak about happiness (eudaimonia).
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For Aristotle, it is the ontological priority of substance that provides order
to the ways in which we speak of nature, and accounts for the dependence of
the other ways of speaking. Accordingly, these secondary ways of speaking
of nature depend on nature as the substance of things as follows:
Nature asmatter: matter (i.e., thematter of a substance) is said to be
natural in virtue of being able to receive the source of movement;
Nature as processes of becoming and growing: these processes are
said to be natural in virtue of proceeding from nature as the sub-
stance of things;
Nature as source ofmotion: as a source either potentially or actually
it is in nature in virtue of the substance of things.
What Aristotle provides here is an explanation of the dependence of the sec-
ondary, non-core instances of nature on the core instance, viz., nature as
substance. Accordingly, the core sense of nature is prior in denition and
prior in logos, since matter dened as “that which can receive this” (Met.
IV.4, 1015a15–16) refers to substance, as do the denitions of nature as a pro-
cess of growth and as origin of change (since substance must be both that
which undergoes generation and that which is the subject of change).29
Recognizing the homonymy of nature, and especially the way in which
the various ways of speaking about nature are ordered to a core sense, pro-
vides a great deal of clarity where there had been obscurity. For Aristotle,
the project of arriving at scientic explanation (episte¯me¯) demands identi-
fying the things that can be known. ings that can be ordered to a single
species or genus are knowable and denable. But not all things are ordered
to a single genus (such as the case with nature). Making precise the relations
between the various ways of speaking about something that either does not
t into a single genus or transects more than one genus is the job for the
analysis of homonymy.
roughout his writing, Aristotle identies many other instances of sys-
tematic homonymy. Not all are so clearly organized by means of an identi-
able core with dependent senses that can be analytically derived from the
core. ere are, as is well known, ongoing scholarly disputes over whether
some things identied by Aristotle as homonyms are in fact so: most fa-
mously, scholars dispute the success of Aristotle’s case for the homonymy
of being. It has been suggested, and I think this is right, that each of the
homonyms identied by Aristotle needs its own analysis to determine
whether it is non-synonymous or not. Moreover, despite identifying and,
29 For a more detailed analysis, see (Ward 2008, 137–145).
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in some cases, analyzing, systematic homonyms, Aristotle does not provide
us with either a principle or a methodology for determining core depen-
dence. is is not meant to suggest that such a principle or methodology is
unattainable, but only that one needs to be identied and defended.
Now, let us return to the question of how to resolve the question of
ground, specically with a view to accommodating the proponents’ desire
to establish ground’s unicity alongside the criticisms that ground seems to
exhibit heterogeneous traits. Recall Koslicki’s analysis of the dierent inter-
pretations of the claim that ground is a unied phenomenon. Let us grant
for the time being that Koslicki is correct in her assessment that “the unity of
grounding and the heterogeneity of grounding stand on roughly equal foot-
ing” (Koslicki forthcoming). Recall that her analysis showed that, while the
determinable/determinate and the moral/natural species of grounding can
be seen to share certain objective characteristics (they both exhibit asym-
metry, irreexivity, for example), they are also objectively distinct (due to
the type of essential connection claimed to exist via the grounding rela-
tions). Koslicki, like the proponents of grounding mentioned above, takes
it that the grounding idiom is either univocal or (merely) equivocal (what
she calls the “mere resemblance” interpretation of grounding, according to
which “the distinct relations which go under the name, ‘grounding’, exhibit
various objective similarities”), and that these options are exhaustive. How-
ever, it seems fairly clear that the analysis to which Koslicki subjects various
species of grounding is consistent with themethod used by Aristotle himself
in Topics in order to test for whether terms are or are not non-synonymous:
that is, the method of testing for homonymy. In doing so, Koslicki has gone
some way to show that ground could be an Aristotelian, that is, a systematic
homonym.
But a big question remains: Would a contemporary neo-Aristotelian
metaphysician avail herself of the doctrine of substantial priority, or some-
thing functionally similar, in order to distinguish between core and depen-
dent senses of ground itself? If ground turns out to be an Aristotelian, or
systematic homonym (rather than a single relation or a single genus), then
we have avoided the unpleasant outcome that ground is a ‘mere’ or discrete
homonymwith nothing in commonbetween any of the things that are called
‘grounding relations’. If it can be shown to be an Aristotelian homonym,
then we might be able to satisfy the proponents of ground by supplying the
much-desired unity of the grounding phenomenon by supplying unity out
of multiplicity. But is this something that contemporary neo-Aristotelian
metaphysicians would nd appealing?
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5. Is Ground Homonymous in this Aristotelian Sense?
Is ground a discrete homonym or a systematic one? is is a new way to
construe the debate between the proponents of ground and their critics. In
other words, it is no longer just a question of whether ground is univocal or
(merely) equivocal, i.e., as a discrete homonym, but now whether it can be
considered a systematic homonym. What would it mean to treat ground as
a systematic homonym?
It is up to the proponents of ground to engage in the work of determin-
ing what is core about ground (e.g., asymmetry and transitivity30 seem to be
obvious, but on their own they may not be sucient to distinguish ground
from other types of metaphysical priority, e.g., being a substring of). e
tests for homonymy suggested by Aristotle in Topics may do some helpful
work in this regard. Aer all, proponents of ground present their case for
the unity and the usefulness of ground by means of generating examples
and discerning their shared formal properties. Critics of the grounding phe-
nomenon attack the examples, displaying their lack of unity. Perhaps there
is a problem in proceeding this way, since some proponents of ground may
have latched on to false cases of the grounding relation, and have thereby put
forwardwhat are in fact discrete relations that aremerely called ‘ground’.e
tests for homonymymight do some work to settle on the systematic cases of
ground (if in fact there are any).
e diculty this poses to proponents of ground is not insignicant. To
preserve the unity of the phenomenon of ground by construing it as an Aris-
totelian homonym, then ground itselfmust have a coremeaning uponwhich
other senses or instances of ground are dependent. However, proponents of
ground have another desideratum for their theory thatmay not be consistent
with construing ground as an Aristotelian homonym: namely, they seem to
assume that the phenomenon of ground, and the meaning of the grounding
idiom itself, are ontologically neutral (viz., Schaer’s relata-neutral charac-
terization of items related by ground). Whether or not ground is or can be
so ontologically neutral is not a question that I can take up here. What I do
want to point out, however, is that it will not be possible to maintain both
the claim to the ontological neutrality of the grounding phenomenon and
to identify a core or fundamental sense of ground upon which the other in-
stances are dependent. Aristotle could do so, but he was working within the
presuppositions and commitments of his own ontological theory. For ex-
ample, Aristotle was free to identify a core sense of any of his homonymous
terms in away thatwas consistentwith his philosophical commitments, such
30 But see Schaer (2012), who provides a number of counterexamples to the transitivity of
ground; the response by Litland (2013) aims to counter these counterexamples.
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as identifying the priority of nature as substance, which gives order to the
other senses of nature that depend on substance. While those who are work-
ing on the theory of ground do see themselves as working, broadly speaking,
within the Aristotelian tradition, they may not want to commit themselves
to every element of Aristotle’s philosophy. But it is dicult to see how they
could preserve their claim to the ontological neutrality of ground and at the
same time distinguish between core and non-core instances.
Still, it is worth pressing the point to nd the required unity of the
grounding phenomenonby considering it as anAristotelian homonym. Pro-
ponents of the coherence of the grounding relation as the primitive structur-
ing conception ofmetaphysics will have to show that of things called ground,
they have:
(i) denitions or explanations which overlap but not completely; and
(ii) some core to which they are related; and
(iii) a core relation of ground that organizes the other dependent ground-
ing relations.31
Recasting (iii) in the grounding idiom:
(iii-a) the core ground relation grounds the dependent grounding rela-
tions.
Rephrasing this in Wilson’s idiomatic sense (although without construing
this in terms of a genus-species relation, as she tries to do), ‘big-G’ Ground
grounds ‘little-g’ grounding relations. is might at rst seem absurd, since
the condition required to identify a core sense of ground relies on the no-
tion of ground itself. It might appear, then, that ground cannot be an Aris-
totelian homonym, since the very phenomenon of Aristotelian homonymy
is itself explained by ground (or metaphysical dependence, ontological pri-
ority, asymmetrical relation, etc.). And this seems incoherent!
But this, still, is worth further consideration. Take as a comparison the
core-dependent homonym priority. ings are called prior in a number of
senses, according to Aristotle. As a core-dependent homonym, however,
this means that there is some prior instance of priority on which the other
instances ontologically depend. Let us propose that this is a non-viciously
circular way of identifying core versus dependent senses of structured rela-
tions such as priority and grounding. If there is any coherence to the idea
that priority is homonymous in this way, then there may be coherence to the
31 e variables x and y here can stand for Fa, Fb or for P orQ (for cases in which something
is grounded in one of its disjuncts).
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claim that ground is also homonymous, despite having to appeal to itself in
order to distinguish core from non-core instances of the phenomenon.32
By identifying ground as an Aristotelian homonym, proponents can
avoid the diculties thrust upon it by Koslicki’s andWilson’s eorts to con-
strue grounding relations to be ordered as genus (’big-G’ Ground) and
species (’little-g’ grounding relations). If ground (or Ground) were to be a
genus, then it would have to be synonymous (in Aristotle’s sense) or univo-
cal. If so, then it could be dened. Koslicki andWilson have gone some way
to show that ground is not unied in this way. But the alternative is not sim-
ply to accept the heterogeneity of grounding relations to bemerely equivocal
(and thus theoretically useless). Ground as an Aristotelian homonymwould
allow proponents to acknowledge ground’s heterogeneity, while at the same
time fasten upon a means to display its unity.
To do so, though, will require proponents of ground to identify a core
sense of ground, which can be used to organize and thereby unify other
senses of grounding relations. It is not immediately clearwhat this core sense
could be, but one option suggests itself. Rather than looking amongst the
various types of grounding relations to see which are more fundamental—
more core—than others, one could instead look to the formal properties
of ground to discern what are in fact ground’s dierentiae. As we listed
above, there is some consensus amongst proponents that ground is irreex-
ive, asymmetrical, transitive and explanatory. Also noted, however, was
the frequent disagreement amongst metaphysicians over whether these for-
mal characteristics are, in fact, proper to ground. Perhaps recognizing the
homonymous character of ground provides a way to manage both the con-
sensus and the disagreement as follows. Since systematic, core homonyms
share a name but have denitions that overlap but not completely, there
will be some types of grounding relations sharing some formal character-
istics (i.e., dierentiae), but not others. Other types of grounding relations
may have partially overlapping but non-identical formal characteristics with
these, and so on.
In conclusion, it is interesting to note that proponents of groundwho in-
32 e alternative would be that groundwould be amenable to denition that does not appeal
to itself. If this is the case, then ground would turn out to be a species of some other genus,
distinguished from other members of that genus by a uniquely distinguishing feature, i.e.,
by its dierentia. But if ground turns out to be a species of some other genus, then it is not
primitive and unanalyzable, as many of its proponents would like it to be.
As a reviewer pointed out, that ground has to appeal to itself in order to distinguish be-
tween core and non-core instances might seem to entail an innite regress. Perhaps this is
the case, although it is not necessarily a vicious regress, especially if grounding turns out
to be able to account for relations of fundamentality without ‘bottoming out’, so to speak,
in some foundation or other. See Raven (manuscript).
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sist (without argument) that ground is a unied phenomenon have consid-
ered the objection that ground is what they call ‘merely homonymous’, and
in doing so they have explicitly invoked Aristotle. For example, Jonathan
Schaer considers a possible objection to the theory of grounding from an
(unnamed) opponent who dismisses the notion of ground as ‘merely [i.e.
discretely] homonymous’. Schaer, however, errs in his understanding of
Aristotelian homonymy and accordingly dismisses its utility and application
to the theory of grounding, and instead issues a desideratum for a unied
notion of grounding that, malgre lui, comes out sounding much closer to
what Aristotle himself had in mind by systematic homonymy:
I digress to consider a possible objection, according towhich there are
many distinct notions of grounding, united only in name. Whereas
Aristotle claimed that there were many notions of priority, singling
out priority in nature as foremost among them (c.f. Owen 1986a, 186),
this objector goes further, holding that priority in nature is itself ‘said
in many ways’. By way of reply I see no more reason to consider this
a case of mere homonymy, than to consider various cases of identity
asmerely homonymous.33 In both cases, there is a common term, and
the same formal structure. is is some evidence of real unity. At
the very least, I would think that it is incumbent on the objector to
provide further reason for thinking that the general term ‘grounding’
denotes no unied notion. (Schaer 2009, 376–377)
While proponents of ground have oered no positive argument for ground’s
unity, and while it is clear (from Koslicki’s analysis and what has been said
here) that ground is not univocal, it seems that the burden of proving how
there can be unity in the multiplicity of grounding relations is placed back
on its proponents. Aristotelian homonymy is a good way to start.
But what about Koslicki’s and Wilson’s complaint that ground, given its
heterogeneity, cannot perform the ne-grained work its proponents want
for it to do? ere is both a positive and a negative answer to this question,
one that can only be settled by establishing one’s own tolerance for the phe-
nomenonofAristotelian homonymy itself.e positive aspects of proposing
that grounding relations are homonymous are several. By being homony-
mously organized around a core, ground retains exibility for its range of
33 Schaer’s comment about identity being ‘merely homonymous’ reveals that he views
homonymy in terms of sharing a name only. To anticipate the dierence between this
sense of homonymy and Aristotelian homonymy properly understood, see (Shields 1999,
268–269), in which he canvasses the multiple contemporary and historical notions of cau-
sation: “Judging from a sucient remove, it is hard to escape the thought that each of these
theories captures something important about causation; and it is tempting to infer on this
basis, since they are in some cases incompatible with one another, that causation admits
of no general univocal analysis. . . .Aristotle rightly resists this temptation.”
52 Is Ground Said-in-Many-Ways?
applications, while at the same time preserves the non-reducibility and in-
eliminability of the grounding relation. Moreover, the presence or absence
of any one particular formal feature of ground (e.g., necessity in cases of full
ground, but not in cases of partial ground) can be explained, since not all
grounding relations admit of perfectly overlapping formal features. (If they
did, ground would be a synonym, and thus denable.)
e negative aspects of recognizing ground as an Aristotelian homonym
are just all those that accrue to Aristotle’s very idea of homonymy itself. Sys-
tematic homonymy is dicult to identify, challenging to analyze, and op-
erates with an idiosyncratic notion of unity, namely a unity in multiplic-
ity. Most pressingly, it is open to construing the homonymous character
of ground (or any other purported systematic homonym) as ambiguous—
and thus philosophically weak or useless as a tool. However, ambiguity is
not necessarily vicious, especially if we recognize that ground, like count-
less other central and important metaphysical explanations (such as iden-
tity, cause, priority, being, and so on), is simply not amenable to the kind of
denition some might prefer.
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